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AI & Arms Control: The Cold War Continued
By: Robert Sobon
Abstract
As artificial intelligence (“AI”) begins to play an ever-increasing role in military affairs,
the traditional role of humans in warfare is likely to be diminished, if not eliminated, with time.
The future of military intervention could depend entirely on the decisions and capabilities of AIpowered systems. This poses real-world, present-day questions, long before “intelligent” combat
becomes a reality. One of those questions, includes the viability of arms control in artificially
intelligent warfare. This paper addresses theories of arms control, introduces various historical and
present-day examples of arms control, the concept of artificial intelligence, and examines whether
conventional approaches could apply to artificially intelligent instruments of war. In doing so, the
conclusion reached is that conventional obstacles plaguing arms control treaties are likely to be
exacerbated by the inherent complexities involved in AI development and deployment. To
effectuate success, nations must cooperate now to establish universally agreed-upon terms such as
keeping the human warfighter behind the war machine and reducing automation when a system is
responsible for taking a life. Further delay in establishing such agreements will continue to thrust
society into what one can only describe as the AI Cold War – a conflict which may otherwise carry
on indefinitely.
Introduction
In 1945, the world bore witness to the collapse of the Nazi regime in Germany and the end
of World War II.1 The conflict catapulted the world into a race towards military supremacy and
technological might. World War II paved the way for the development of microwaves, radar, more
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advanced computers, enhanced aeronautic capabilities, and nuclear weapons.2 Intense competition
between the United States and the Soviet Union to develop military technology defined the next
several decades, culminating into what became known as the Cold War.3 This conflict was a
geopolitical chess match which lacked the traditional bloodshed and destruction of wars past.4
Instead, the United States and the Soviet Union flexed their ideological and industrial muscles to
prove which was the superior nation.5 The exact period in which the Cold War transpired is often
contested, and some would argue it never truly ended.6 Instead, it lay in a state of dormancy until
today. Today, we find ourselves in the midst of what could be considered, the AI Cold War.
Mankind has continued to make strategic advancements in science and technology at
breakneck speeds.7 We have progressed as a people from putting a man on the moon, to putting
the moon in our living room with the help of virtual reality. 8 As these remarkable innovations
continue to develop, and countries continue financing various technological endeavors, their
defense-related concentrations begin to shift as well. Developed world powers have begun the
transition from warheads to algorithms.9 Specifically, the growth of Artificial Intelligence,
otherwise known as AI.10
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AI is slated to become the most important device, if not the only one, through which
warfare will be conducted in the future.11 China, Russia, the United States, and other sophisticated
nations all view AI as a determinative factor of their world power in the future.12 As Russian
President Putin so eloquently stated in 2017, whoever wins the AI race, will rule the world.13
Mr. Putin is correct. Militaries around the world are investing money in the development
of autonomous weapon systems as fast as their treasuries can print it.14 The United States
Department of Defense has invested over $15 million in the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center
(“JAIC”) so far, which is responsible for the assessment and application of AI defense projects
across all branches of the military.15 As these ventures continue to take place and expand, major
implications begin to stem from AI’s impact on conventional wartime concepts like rules of
engagement, laws of war, arms control treaties, and whether the use of AI-based military systems
constitutes warfare at all.16
This paper will address the tip of the spear and examine whether orthodox arms control
agreements will ever be capable of governing the rules of engagement and arms in an artificially
intelligent future. Or, on the other hand, whether there is any practicality in implementing such
measures to begin with.
I.

Artificial Intelligence
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Artificial Intelligence is defined as the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled
robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings.17 Artificially intelligent
systems are created with human-like capabilities such as the capacity to reason, to learn from
experience, and to discover meaning.18 Although they have not yet reached full human intellect or
the capacity to be sentient, their near-human skills are stunning.19
A. A Brief History of Artificial Intelligence
The concept of artificial intelligence dates back to the days of the great Greek philosophers
and their beliefs that human intelligence could be mechanized.20 They imagined “an instrument
that could accomplish its own work” and save humans from performing tedious labor.21 In the
1700s, Jonathan Swift’s novel Gulliver’s Travels depicts what he calls the “engine” – which was
essentially a modern-day computer.22 These intelligent concepts continued to appear in popular
literature and film throughout the following centuries. Movies like Metropolis and The Wizard of
Oz depicted humanoid robots as far back as 1927.23
Fictional examples aside, in the 1940s, the Atanasoff Berry Computer was created and
labeled the first electronic digital computer.24 Although not quite artificially intelligent, the almost
mystical appeal of these machines captured the popular imagination and influenced the work of
individuals around the world.25 One such individual, a man by the name of Alan Turing, proposed
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the idea that machines could be used to reason and solve problems just like humans can.26 In 1950,
Turing published his famous paper called Computing Machinery and Intelligence, in which he
developed a framework for intelligent machines and proposed to his readers the famous question,
“[c]an machines think?”27
Several years later, John McCarthy, a computer scientist, coined the term for what we now
know as, artificial intelligence.28 These events soon gave rise the first AI computer programs,
machines, and catapulted research pondering the theory that the essence of human life – the ability
to reason and think, could be harnessed by non-human entities like machines.29
The first human-like rendition of AI is arguably the project known as ELIZA.30 The
interactive computer program was capable of engaging in a somewhat interesting and human-like
conversations between an end-user and its AI counterpart.31 ELIZA could ask an individual to tell
it what has been bothering them, and a user could say the weather is awful – to which she would
respond, “I’m not quite sure I understand you fully.”32 Of course, after a few attempts the mock
psychotherapist would respond properly with, “You say you hate the current weather?,” and work
with you to pass your plight.33 Countless other real-world and entertainment examples came to
fruition throughout the late 1900s building upon this foundation including C-3PO in Star Wars,
WABOT-2 which could read and play music, and even the horrifying childhood toy we all grew
to hate, Furby.34
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Modern examples include Honda’s ASIMO robot, Roombas, NASA’s rovers, Amazon
Alexa, Google Deepmind’s AlphaGo, Tesla’s self-driving vehicles, and other well-known
projects; all of which contain the innerworkings of a century’s long journey with artificial
intelligence.35
The future of AI lies not only in our convenient home gadgets and self-driving cars, but
notably in the commencement and execution of warfare.36 AI-powered autonomous weapons are
capable or surveying land, identifying enemy combatants, and even engaging targets without
traditional human intervention.37 Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (“LAWS”) like killer
robots do not yet exist in the capacity we would imagine them to, however, researchers believe it
is possible to develop such conscious technologies within the next few decades.38
B. How AI Works
Understanding the interplay between AI and arms control requires at least a rudimentary
understanding of how AI operates. The first rendition of AI technology is often referred to as
symbolic AI.39 Symbolic AI was named so because it made use of symbolic reasoning which may
also be described as binary “if-then” statements (e.g., if X=Y and Y=Z then X=Z).40 This approach
to AI formation requires encoding the information one wants the machine to know into a set of
“if-then” statements that the machine executes to solve problems.41 The final product is known as
an algorithm.42 Humans are kept in the loop in this type of AI, because all of the machine’s
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capabilities and limitations are based on developer input.43 The machine is only capable of making
the decisions and solving the problems it has been programmed to unravel, inhibiting true
autonomy.44
The second leap in AI’s growth came through what is called machine learning.45 Machine
learning automates the learning process of the algorithms described earlier.46 Therefore, rather
than requiring human intervention to make corrections or adjust the information embedded in a
code, the algorithms are designed to identify patterns and apply what they have “learned” to create
more “if-then” statements.47 These statements continue to grow and make a system more
“intelligent” through user-input or general data acquisition.48 Although machine learning is as old
as symbolic AI, it did not become prominent until recent times – sparking the development of
modern AI applications.49
AI’s third leap was the advent of what is called deep learning.50 This process allows AI
systems to identify objects and perform complex tasks, while continuing to learn from its actions,
absent the human involvement mentioned earlier.51 Deep learning is a subset of machine learning
and works very much like a human brain.52 Large data sets are used to teach the AI what it needs
to know and although machine learning and deep learning are relatively similar, the latter does not
need structured input to understand the data it is fed.53 The AI is programmed to perform rapid
calculations based on the ingestion of large quantities of data and progressively improves the
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accuracy of the calculations it generates over time.54 This is the science behind contemporary
gadgets like digital assistants, voice-enabled devices, and self-driving vehicles.55
To simplify the concept even more, consider digital assistants like Apple’s Siri, Amazon’s
Alexa, or Google’s Assistant. Years ago, one had to train their device to recognize their voice,
perhaps by repeating their name or a certain phrase several times; that is machine learning.56 Now
one can open their new product, power it on, and immediately command it to play music; that is
deep learning.57
As one can infer from how AI functions, its success is highly dependent on the availability
and acquisition of data.58 DOMO, a cloud software company, releases annual reports measuring
the amount of data collected each minute for a given year.59 In 2019, that report held that
Americans used over 4,416,720 gigabytes of Internet data per minute.60 To put that into
perspective, users consume about 7GB streaming high-definition video on Netflix each hour.61 As
the amount of data we consume and produce grows, the capabilities of AI systems increase
proportionally.62
C. Concerns with Autonomous Weapons
The mounting fears surrounding autonomous weapons and the like have sparked outcries
from prominent figures in society.63 In 2015, Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, Steve Wozniak and
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many other leaders in the AI and robotics space published an open letter condemning the
development of autonomous weapons systems.64 The authors collectively stated that,
The key question for humanity today is whether to start a global AI arms race or to
prevent it from starting. If any major military power pushes ahead with AI weapon
development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable, and the endpoint of this
technological trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will become the
Kalashnikovs of tomorrow.65
Issues such as these are at the forefront of AI development and present a plethora of ethical, moral,
and regulatory concerns.
In response, various coalitions and AI think-tanks have been established to bring some
semblance of uniformity in approach when developing AI-based products, irrespective of their
application.66 For example, the International Technology Law Association (“ITLA”) published a
global policy framework entitled, Responsible AI, which calls for actions including grounding AI
development in human-centric principles like accountability, that makes organizations developing,
deploying, or using AI systems responsible for harm caused by AI.67 These principles are not all
encompassing, and this organization is not the only entity promoting AI-centric tenets.68
Companies like Microsoft and other major competitors in the AI space have come together to
promote the idea of responsible AI development.69
Notions of responsibility, legitimacy, and accountability have long been significant
components of ethical warfare.70 Humans have attempted to define and regulate agents of war
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since the dawn of humanity.71 The Mahabharata introduces concepts like the rule of
proportionality stating, “[o]ne should not attack chariots with cavalry; chariot warriors should
attack chariots. One should not assail someone in distress, neither to scare him nor to defeat him.”72
Proportionality implies a balancing act when conducting offensive military operations in which
the methods of warfare cannot be disproportionate to the advantage sought.73 Other examples are
evident in religious texts like the Torah which states:
When you besiege a city for a long time, making war against it in order to take it,
you shall not destroy its trees by wielding an axe against them. You may eat from
them, but you shall not cut them down. Are the trees in the field human, that they
should be besieged by you? Only the trees that you know are not trees for food you
may destroy and cut down, that you may build siegeworks against the city that
makes war with you until it falls.74
Treaties, customs, and ordinary human values have influenced what are now known as the laws of
war and rules of engagement.75 These ideas seek to mitigate the suffering induced by war on an
international scale and have produced countless declarations, conventions, treaties, and judgments
ranging from the 1864 Geneva Convention to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.76
As the AI Cold War continues, the application of such principles continues to worry
developers, academics, and civilians alike.77 Arms researchers pose questions like, should a
machine be making life and death decisions on the battlefield?78 Or, whether in these warfare
settings a military advantage is outweighed by the harm imposed on noncombatants.79 The
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Pentagon has even adopted its own principles calling for individuals to “exercise appropriate levels
of judgments and care” when deploying and using AI systems, and that such automated weaponry
should be “traceable” and “governable” – in other words created with some type of kill switch
mechanism.80
These concerns and historical approaches to warfare have caused numerous AI-based
weapons programs to be delayed or terminated.81 In 2018 over 3,000 Google employees signed a
petition in protest of Google’s joint venture with the Department of Defense’s known as Project
Maven.82 The project aimed to develop and integrate “computer-vision algorithms needed to help
military and civilian analysts encumbered by the sheer volume of full-motion video data that DoD
collects every day in support of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.”83 In other
words, the venture uses AI to rapidly process vast imagery utilized for target acquisition.84 Unlike
conventional warfare where Soldiers are responsible for identifying and subsequently engaging an
enemy, AI weapons like Project Maven can replace that causal link.85
Despite mounting concerns, nations around the globe are investing heavily in the dream of
forming AI-powered militaries.86 In 2016, the United States Navy and Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) launched what it named Sea Hunter.87 Sea Hunter is an
unmanned anti-submarine vehicle capable of operating completely autonomously for long periods
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of time.88 The U.S. Navy aims to introduce fleets of autonomous war vessels into the high seas
and begin moving away from large numbers of manned ships.89 The U.S. Army utilizes variants
of what are known as Autonomous Remote Engagement Systems (“ARES”).90 These mounted
machine guns are managed by AI which identifies targets and allows the end-user to fire the
weapon remotely.91 South Korea military hardware manufacturer DoDAMM introduced Super
aEgis 2 in 2010, described as “an automated gun turret that can detect and lock onto human targets
from kilometers away, day or night and in any weather conditions, and deliver some heavy
firepower.”92 These few examples and applications of AI in war machines are only the tip of the
spear.
The fundamental complexities of war are difficult to grasp by Soldiers on the battlefield,
let alone autonomous weapons.93 These systems, even when well developed, can commit fatal
errors; errors for which we have not yet conceptualized effective regulatory or recovery
procedures.94 Some military leaders have addressed the fact that, autonomous weapons lack an
ability to feel empathy and be merciful in war – restraints which limit the potential for brutality in
conventional human combat.95 The intricacies inherent in AI development as well as the execution
of war seem almost insurmountable as the two concepts begin to merge.
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II.

Arms Control Defined

Arms control is defined as a “limitation of the use, exchange, or manufacture of military
weapons by nations often as a policy established through diplomatic negotiation.”96 Arms control
implies collaboration between states, generally in areas of military policies, to reduce the
likelihood and destructiveness of war.97
A. A Brief History of Arms Control
In the shadow of hostility, humans have long attempted to make the world more secure and
peaceful to curb the consequences of war.98 Ancient civilizations like the Greeks made pacts during
times of conflict in which sources of water could not be restricted or destroyed.99 In Europe during
the Middle Ages, agreements were made to protect the clergy as well as individuals identified as
non-combatants.100 In 1675, France and Germany prohibited the use of bullets laced with
poisonous agents.101 In the early 1900s, international peace conferences such as the League of
Nations and the Geneva Conference were held to ban the use of noxious gas and to encourage the
reduction of arms.102 These small but mighty agreements led to more prominent ones such as the
Geneva Protocol and the Geneva Convention; and paved the way for international bodies like the
United Nations.103 Each of these treaties, conventions, and international bodies shared a common
goal – to limit the destructiveness of war that has plagued humanity since the beginning of time.
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Some of the most well-known arms control agreements include the Antiballistic Missile
Treaty (“ABM”), which limits the use of anti-ballistic missiles created to counter nuclear weapons
in an effort to limit production of more offensive arms.104 The Chemical Weapons Convention
(“CWC”) prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.105 The
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (“NPT”) was established to stop nuclear propagation and contains
agreements from major nuclear powers including the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom,
France, and China.106 The Strategic and Tactical Arms Reduction Treaty (“START”) was devised
to foster working agreements between the United States and former Soviet Union to slow the
nuclear arms race.107 These are just a few examples of the countless arms control deals aimed at
ceasing, slowing, or eliminating armaments entirely.
B. Arms Control Purpose, Enactment, and Enforcement
Arms control is typically accomplished through a collective settlement between adversarial
or competing nations.108 The governments of participating states agree to certain terms regarding
arms, conduct, or any other matter, and confirm the agreement by signing a treaty, holding a
periodic convention, or any other similar act.109 To ensure compliance, independent international
bodies sometimes conduct inspections in person, verifications via satellite or airplane flyovers, or
participating states will inspect one another.110 These inspections are largely agreed upon within
the terms of the arms control treaty as well.111
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Arms control is also considered by many thinkers to be directly responsible for tackling
what is known as the security dilemma.112 The security dilemma describes a situation in which
states increase their security posture; typically, by expanding the size of their militaries or their
number of warheads, which prompts other nations to do the same.113 Arms control introduces
conditions which states agree upon to prevent this type of risky competition.114 Additionally, arms
control provides a means for cost reduction as well as limits on potential damage resulting from
war.115 For example, states may agree to prohibit the use of certain types of munitions to lessen
the cost of recovery following a conflict.116
C. Issues with Arms Control
Despite their promises, arms control measures have been generally ineffective throughout
history.117 Early renderings of arms control treaties were afflicted by imprecise language.118 By
identifying loopholes in a treaty’s text, signatories have circumvented their terms by cleverly
altering designs or modifying the fabrication of the weapons or items of focus.119 For example, the
Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 was established by the allied powers of World War I and sought
to prevent an arms race by limiting the production of certain naval assets by imposing restrictions
on weights, sizes, and variants of vessels.120 Countries like the United States found loopholes in
the treaty by designing better ships whilst adhering to the weight restrictions.121 Other countries
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like Italy misrepresented their weights entirely as the treaty lacked any means of effective
review.122 Due to the lack of compliance, the treaty was scrapped shortly before the end of 1936.123
The ability to withdraw or to remain a non-signatory from a treaty’s inception weighs
heavily against arms control success.124 For example, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (“NPT”) has 4 non-signatories including Israel, South Sudan, Pakistan, and
India, none of whom have signed the treaty.125 The objective of the NPT was to promote nuclear
weapon disarmament while permitting peaceful applications of nuclear power like, generating
energy.126 Each country cites various explanations for their lack of cooperation. For example, India
argues that the NPT creates restrictions on possession of nuclear weapons upon newly developing
nations, because states which tested nuclear arms prior to 1967 are permitted to retain them.127
Other countries like Israel cite foreign policy decisions in which the country refuses to divulge
information regarding nuclear arms.128 Setting aside a given country’s motivations, lacking
important participants makes valuable treaties like the NPT virtually worthless.129
Foreign policy decisions like deliberate ambiguity, frustrate arms control agreements as
well.130 Deliberate ambiguity refers to a country’s attempt to protect certain information to avert
risk.131 It gives rise to its own set issues, as these actions may often be misinterpreted by other
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nations.132 For example, in the early 2000s, Saddam Hussein took part in a form of deliberate
ambiguity regarding Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”).133 Saddam used
this ambiguity to his advantage by becoming a fearmonger for Iraq’s neighboring states and to
control the country’s citizens.134 Under the auspice of Saddam Hussein owning WMDs, the United
States invaded Iraq in 2003.135 Other instances of strategic ambiguity have caused lesser, albeit
noteworthy consequences even between allied nations. For example, the United States conceals
whether certain naval surface ships contain nuclear arms.136 This policy of deliberate ambiguity
has led to New Zealand banning United States Navy ships from its ports.137
The lack of implications resulting from a signatory’s failure to abide by or join an arms
control agreement is likewise disadvantageous.138 Russia has repeatedly violated the Intermediaterange Nuclear Forces Treaty (“INF”) by developing, testing, and deploying intermediate-range
missiles which the treaty prohibited.139 The result of this noncompliance led to the United States
withdrawal from the treaty in 2019 and it is no longer in force. 140 In 2013, Syria was found to be
using chemical agents in attacks in Ghouta, and consequently decided to acknowledge their
existence and partake in the Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC).141 Since then, Syria has
experienced two known chemical attacks. The Khan Shaykhun chemical attack in 2017 killed at
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least 89 individuals and injured over 541.142 The Douma chemical attack in 2018 claimed the lives
of nearly 50 people and injured over 100.143 The penalty for these violations included repeated air
strikes against alleged chemical weapons facilities and nothing more.144
Despite the multitude of existing and past arms control treaties, their efficacy continues to
be limited or nonexistent.145 Countries involved in these agreements have the difficult task of
trading transparency and security.146 The methods of verification are often intrusive, which some
states fear will inform their adversaries about their capabilities or current developments.147 Nations
may simply elect not to participate, withdraw, or violate agreements facing little reaction from
other signatories.148 The difficulties inherent in enacting and enforcing traditional methods of arms
control, will surely inhibit the practicability of such measures when applied to complex AIpowered instruments of war.
III.

AI and Arms Control: Combined Obstacles

Considering the various shortcomings of arms control treaties past and present, as well as
the complexities associated with AI development, the following aims to combine the matters into
distinct subjects that stem from the hybridization of these issues.
A. Responsibility
Responsibility is arguably the largest hurdle in AI development and deployment.149
Conventional weapons require user input, meaning the combatant is responsible for pulling the
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trigger or otherwise engaging a device.150 When it comes to AI-based weapons however, many of
these technologies may be completely automated or require such little human input, that the firing
of a weapon, for example, may involve little consideration. Take for instance, the SGR-1, a 5.5mm
machine gun and 40mm grenade launcher developed by Samsung.151 This sentry robot is equipped
with heat and motion detectors that can operate at distances of more than 2 miles.152 As of 2014,
the devices were deployed at the demilitarized zone in South Korea and are fully capable of
identifying and engaging targets with little to no human intervention.153
The introduction of war machines like the SGR-1 raises both practical and philosophical
questions. If the system misidentifies a target, engages said target, or advises its user to engage a
target to which the user submits, who is to be held responsible? Is this machine error or user error?
Is the developer who did not create a failsafe responsible for an AI system’s resulting actions?
Does one nation hold another responsible for implementing autonomous systems without complex
testing? There are certainly more questions than answers for responsibility-bearing in arms control,
specifically in cases where we are not dealing with traditional arms – pushing against the efficacy
of an arms control agreement today and certainly in the future with AI-powered weapons.
B. Transparency
Transparency is already a point of contention for contemporary arms control treaties.154
Should arms control enter the space of AI, transparency is likely to be impossible to establish. In
this context, transparency means, “a duty for businesses and governments to inform people that
they are interacting with an AI system and to provide information about its specifications,
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including the origin and nature of the data used to train the algorithm and to describe what it is that
the AI system does, and how it does it.”155 This is a difficult goal for civilian product
implementation, let alone arms control.156 AI is often considered a proprietary technology, and
defense companies and developers alike are prone to maintaining some level of secrecy regarding
their technology.157
If arms control agreements are adopted by a group of nations, the likelihood that states will
share the algorithmic makeup of their technology seems slim.158 Policies of deliberate ambiguity
are likely to exist in complex AI arms control agreements as they have in conventional agreements
like the NPT. Countries will likely not want to share developments in AI-based defense technology
because it gives them a significant advantage should they enter conflict.159
Even if international agreements are established to promote AI transparency, it may be
impossible to achieve from a scientific perspective.160 The way AI functions is unlike any other
conventional weapon.161 It operates by reaching conclusions via the data provided in an
increasingly unsupervised manner.162 AI does not explicitly share how or why it reaches certain
conclusions.163 This mysterious process is often referred to as the AI “black box.”164 The “black
box” means that we understand what information was fed to an AI system as well as what that
information leads the system to conclude, however, we do not know how the system turned said
input into that output.165 This may not appear troublesome with devices like digital assistants and
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vehicles perhaps, but unexpected or fatal outputs produced by an autonomous weapon introduces
a flood of new concerns.
Transparency is paramount to the success of any arms control agreement.166 It is the
characteristic with which past treaties have succeeded or failed.167 In the case of treaties like the
NPT or others regarding physical warheads, it may be easier to enforce and monitor the efficacy
of these treaties and understand the innerworkings of their development. In the area of AI war
machines, it appears far easier to hide code, provide false information, or even claim absence of
the technology to begin with – and so transparency for AI-powered weapons seems unrealistic at
first glance.
C. Enforcement
Unjust punishments or failure to enforce penalties will likely diminish any potential for AIbased agreements. The penalties imposed by arms control agreements have been historically
deficient and larger states with more geopolitical power tend to walk away unscathed, while less
powerful states are punished harshly for failing to comply.168 As the events taking place in Syria
illustrated, some states may face devastating repercussions in the event they disobey a treaty.169
Others, like Russia, may have had the ability to exit or defy an agreement with little to no
backlash.170 If the provisions of a treaty are imbalanced and stronger states can consume a penalty
while failing to comply, they will do so whilst continuing the offensive act.171
Additionally, a state can conceal the fact that it is developing AI arms by masking the code
designed to automate weapons more easily than it can hide a physical armament which signatories
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can monitor through satellite or directed inspections.172 Even in situations where defiance is found,
signatories’ support for checks can wane, poor reporting procedures may exist, or a target state
may heavily mislead an inspecting organization – prolonging any implementation of penalties.173
Enforcement remains a difficult objective for modern treaties and will likely remain so with any
AI-based agreements.
D. Inclusivity
An arms control agreement is only as effective as the parties involved. Classic arms control
measures have been riddled with feeble membership and virtually no retention.174 As the examples
discussed illustrate, nations participating in arms control treaties tend to exit when the terms of an
agreement no longer align with their foreign policies or objectives.175 All signatories of an arms
control agreement must have a real interest in a treaty’s success otherwise they will likely see the
associated disadvantages as overburdensome and remain uninvolved.176
Moreover, many countries simply never become signatories despite a seemingly
international desire for them to do so.177 If society is to create and employ ethical and legal forms
of AI onto the battlefield, adversaries must agree that each will conduct themselves appropriately
by developing their arms in accordance with the terms of an agreement. Currently, the world is
hard-pressed to see any type of unity in approach. Most world powers including the United States,
Russia, and Australia are vehemently against regulating or banning lethal autonomous weapons,
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whereas China supports legally binding bans or treaties against LAWS.178 A lack of international
cooperation or signatories would render any such ban or arms control measure fruitless.
E. Language
Arms control documents or convention policies must be drafted with precise and living
language. Documents cannot contain language that is vague or ambiguous and must be void of any
potential loopholes that opposing nations could take advantage of.179 If a global conference agrees
to require human intervention in autonomous weapons when faced with the question of taking a
life, the drafted agreement must ensure that there are no gaps in the language, while providing
means for amendments as technologies progress and invariably alter the landscape of treaties.
Examples like the Washington Naval Treaty have demonstrated the consequences of hastily
written treaties.180 The language of an agreement, above all else, is the backbone of its success and
must be drafted in a manner which fosters compliance and encourages involvement.
IV.

AI and Arms Control: Potential Pathways Toward Success

A. Exposure
Despite the many drawbacks and unanswered questions regarding the efficacy of arms
control agreements for autonomous weapons, there are ways in which employment of treaties may
bring about success to varying degrees. For one, defiance may in fact be equally as helpful in
protecting states from rogue AI applications. Nations which fail to obey or enter agreements can
be identified and closely monitored by cosignatories as evidenced by commonly uncooperative
states like Russia.181 Even in situations where arms control is not directly impacted, a notorious
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nation’s actions tend to remain under a vigilant public eye.182 Take for instance, China, and their
alleged development of biologically engineered super soldiers.183 This development is now
international news and countries are keen to follow any further developments.184 The same could
apply to arms control involving AI. Should a nation fail to comply, join, or otherwise be involved
in questionable advancements, they will surely be monitored by adversaries and allies alike, in
which case signatories could also amend treaties to better suit their needs in the face of rogue state
actors.
Additionally, time may be of the essence not only in enacting arms control measures but
pressuring them into existence as well. As the world grows more aware of artificial intelligence
and its potentially devastating uses in combat environments, growing concerns could pressure
lawmakers and world leaders to establish some type of controlling agreements. Organizations have
already begun promoting the idea that all AI-based weapons systems should require strict human
control.185 The United Nations Secretary General believes that “machines with the power and
discretion to take lives without human involvement are politically unacceptable, morally repugnant
and should be prohibited by international law.”186 International bodies such as the United Nations
and entities including the “Campaign to Stop Killer Robots,” the “Future of Life Institute,” and
others have been taking strides to keep the human warfighter behind the fight.187 Maintaining
meaningful human control is likely an aspect many nations would prefer over banning autonomous
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weapons entirely in order to remain competitive, and the continued growth of the AI field along
with public awareness will likely lead to the existence of additional organizations.
B. Internationally Promoted Uses
Despite the negative light surrounding AI and arms control, there are numerous potential
and pacific benefits to these systems. The promotion of these benign applications could be
achieved through international arms control agreements in a non-conventional sense where
development is encouraged in select fields while restricting harmful uses. Advocates of AI war
machines look to AI as a replacement for human fighters.188 AI can be integrated into health care
systems to provide remote care or assistance under hazardous conditions.189 It can even go as far
as providing streamlined transportation solutions lowering costs and reducing if not eliminating
human operations entirely.190 Proponents argue that targeting systems may even enhance the
accuracy of target recognition and limit the hazards of misidentifying targets in complex combat
situations.191 States may agree to promote these specific uses in warfare as a means of
counterbalancing the negative results of combat – the very objective arms control is set out to
achieve.
C. Sheer Necessity
The final and perhaps most likely method in which a pathway towards success exists for
AI-based arms control is by way of necessity alone. AI’s complexities including its “blackbox”
design, the inability to concretely identify bad actors, and society’s historical desire to employ
ethics even in times of armed conflict may further the trend for autonomous weapons awareness
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and the need for international regulation. The potential hazards and uncertainties associated with
autonomous weapons could demand collaboration as did the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons (“TPNW”), which was entered into force January 22, 2021, aimed at banning and
eliminating nuclear weapons.
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The risks of a nuclear holocaust and horrors of wars past may

generate the same reaction regarding the theoretically devastating and inhumane consequences of
an autonomous war – barring international efforts to not act preemptively.
V. Conclusion
As AI continues to play an ever-increasing role in our lives, it will undoubtedly do the same
for military capabilities. Nations around the world continue to harness the power of AI in the hopes
of remaining a contender within our technologically dependent civilization. The uncertainties and
complexities inherent in AI creation and application will frustrate the already struggling notion of
arms control and continue an arms race of global proportion far into the future.
To prevent this, nations must cooperate to establish universally agreed-upon terms such as
keeping the human warfighter behind the war machine and promoting benign uses of artificial
intelligence in combat environments. The same level of cooperation is paramount for the success
of any arms control measure, and global leaders must come to terms with the likelihood that
adversarial nations will employ strategies of deliberate ambiguity or total secrecy. AI’s exponential
growth is unlikely to cease, and inaction now will continue the development of an AI Cold War.
As Alan Turing stated in Computing Machinery and Intelligence, “[w]e can only see a short
distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done.”193
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